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Abstract: According to Jennifer Lackey (2007), one should assert 
that p only if (i) it is reasonable for one to believe that p and (ii) if one 
asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is 
reasonable for one to believe that p. As data for this norm of assertion 
Lackey appeals to the intuition that in cases of ‘selfless assertion’ 
agents assert with epistemic propriety something they don’t believe. 
If that norm of assertion was true, then it would explain why selfless 
assertions are epistemically proper. In this paper we offer a reductio 
ad absurdum of this view. The result is that selfless assertions are not 
epistemically appropriate.
Keywords: Jennifer Lackey. Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion. Moore's 
Paradox. Selfless assertion.
Resumo: De acordo com Jennifer Lackey (2007), deve-se asserir que p 
somente se (i) é razoável acreditar que p e (ii) se alguém asseriu que p, 
afirmaria que p pelo menos em parte porque é razoável acreditar que 
p. Como dados para essa norma de asserção, Lackey apela à intuição 
de que, nos casos de afirmação altruísta, os agentes afirmam com 
propriedade epistêmica algo que não acreditam. Se essa norma de 
afirmação fosse verdadeira, então ela explicaria por que as afirmações 
altruístas são epistemicamente apropriadas. Neste trabalho, oferecemos 
uma reductio ad absurdum desse ponto de vista. O resultado é que os 
asserções altruístas não são epistemicamente apropriados.  
Palavras-chave: Jennifer Lackey. Razoável para Acreditar Norma de Asserção. 
Paradoxo de Moore. Asserção altruísta.
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Consider the following case presented by Jennifer Lackey (2007, p. 599):
Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher, and her religious 
beliefs are grounded in a deep faith that she has had since she was a very 
young child. Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of creationism 
and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite 
this, Stella fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of 
scientific evidence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily 
admits that she is not basing her own commitment to creationism 
on evidence at all but, rather, on the personal faith that she has in an 
all-powerful Creator. Because of this, Stella does not think that religion 
is something that she should impose on those around her, and this is 
especially true with respect to her fourth-grade students. Instead, she 
regards her duty as a teacher to include presenting material that is best 
supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes the truth 
of evolutionary theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson 
today, Stella asserts to her students, 'Modern day Homo sapiens evolved 
from Homo Erectus,' though she herself neither believes nor knows this 
proposition.
Lackey says that Stella selflessly asserted 'Modern day Homo sapiens 
evolved from Homo Erectus.' Her assertion is selfless because she does 
not believe what she asserted (in fact, she believes the opposite), but 
regards as her duty as a teacher to present material supported by 
evidence, regardless of what she personally believes.
The general recipe for generating cases of selfless assertion is the 
following: S selflessly asserts that x if and only if: 
ii(i) It is reasonable for S to believe that x is true;
i(ii) S asserts that x because it is reasonable for her to believe that x 
is true;
(iii) S withholds belief in x for purely non-epistemic reasons; 
(iv) S is aware that it is reasonable for her to believe that x is true.  
Selfless assertions are, according to Lackey, epistemically irre- 
proachable – they are epistemically proper. According to her, this is so 
because conditions i and ii are the only epistemic conditions governing 
assertion and those conditions are satisfied in cases of selfless assertion. 
She captures the idea of epistemic propriety in an epistemic norm she 
calls the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion:
(RTBNA) One should assert that p only if (i) it is reasonable for one 
to believe that p and (ii) if one asserted that p, one would assert that 
p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p.
Lackey characterizes 'reasonable to believe' in RTBNA thus:
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(RB) If it is reasonable for S to believe x on evidence E, then S would 
justifiedly believe x, were she to believe x on E. (LACkEy, 2007, 
p. 611).
(RB) effectively makes whether it is reasonable for S to believe that x 
in her actual situation dependent on whether it is justified for S to believe 
x in most or all counterfactual situations that are similar enough to her 
(actual) situation.
Of course, 'justifiedly believing' is in as much need of clarification as 
is 'reasonable to believe' and Lackey qualifies this notion in two ways: 
first, justifiedly believing is not sufficient for knowledge (even when the 
belief is true), and, second, the epistemic support available to the agent 
has to make her belief likely to be true in the actual world, 'as a matter 
of objective fact,' in order for one to justifiedly believe that p (LACkEy, 
2007, p. 610-611). So, from this second constraint on justifiedly believing 
and (RB), it follows that:
(RB+) If it is reasonable for S to believe that x on evidence E, then 
it is a matter of objective fact that E makes x likely to be true in the 
actual world.
We will now argue that selfless assertions are not epistemic proper. 
And that is because, by RTBNA's own lights, it is not reasonable for 
speakers in those scenarios to believe what they assert. The argument 
(call it Reductio) is a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that selfless 
assertions are epistemically proper. (For ease of exposition we will 
present Reductio using Stella's case, but the argument applies to all 
cases of selfless assertion.)
1. It is epistemically proper for Stella to assert (p) 'Modern day Homo 
Sapiens evolved from Homo Erectus.' [assume for a reductio ad 
absurdum]
2. If it is epistemically proper for Stella to assert p and if it is 
epistemically proper for Stella to assert (~Bp) 'I don't believe that 
p,' then it is epistemically appropriate for her to assert (p & ~Bp) 
[assumption]
3. It is epistemically proper for Stella to assert (p & ~Bp) [from 1,2 
by modus ponnens]
4. qIf it is epistemically proper for Stella to assert (p & ~Bp), then 
she would be justified in believing (p & ~Bp) were she to believe 
it on her evidence. [from (RB)]
5. Stella would be justified in believing (p & ~Bp) were she to believe 
it on her evidence. [from 3,4 by modus ponnens]
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6. It is not the case that Stella would be justified in believing 
(p & ~Bp) were she to believe it on her evidence. [from (RB+)]
Since 5 and 6 entail a contradiction, we may infer the negation of our 
hypothesis:
7. It is not epistemically appropriate for Stella to assert that p.
Reductio is clearly valid. But is it sound? We take it that, with the 
exception of 2, 4 and 6, all steps in Reductio are uncontroversial. We will 
now argue that Lackey is committed to 2, 4 and 6. 
Consider step 2. This is a particular instance of the following general 
principle:
(!) (x)(y)[If it is epistemically proper for S to assert x and if it is 
epistemically proper for S to assert y, then it is epistemically proper 
for S to assert (x & y)]
Because step 2 is an instance of a general principle, there are precisely 
three ways in which one could resist it. Firstly, one could reject the idea 
that it is epistemically proper for Stella to assert p. Secondly, one could 
reject the idea that it is epistemically proper for Stella to assert ~Bp. 
Thirdly, one could reject that it is appropriate for Stella to assert the 
conjunction, (p & ~Bp). Would any of these strategies justify the selfless 
assertion proponent's denial of step 2? The contention here is that they 
would not. Let’s take a look at why that is the case.
The first option quite clearly provides no help to someone who wishes 
to resist  step 2. The reason for that is quite obvious: if one wished to deny 
step 2 by rejecting the left-hand side of the conjunction, one would have 
already agreed with the conclusion that the argument is trying to make1.
The second option is also problematic. After all, cases of selfless 
assertion are, by force of stipulation, cases in which the subject does 
not believe that p. Since that is the case, how could it be epistemically 
inappropriate for Stella to assert that she does not believe that p? If Stella 
asserted that ~Bp, she would be describing a fact about her own mental 
life. More to the point, she would be describing a fact she knows obtains2. 
 
1 This point should be fairly clear. Denying step 2 by denying the left side of the conjunction 
is tantamount to giving up on selfless assertions because the argument just is a reductio ad 
absurdum in which the conclusion is the negation of step 1.
2 Even though it is not explicitly built into the case that Stella knows this, suggesting that 
she does is not a stretch. To see why this is so, notice that it is in the very nature of the case 
that in order to assert something different from what she believes, Stella has to be aware of 
her belief and that it disagrees with what she perceives as the best available evidence.
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So, as it stands, it seems that all necessary conditions for the fulfillment of 
RTBNA3 have been satisfied with respect to ~Bp. But, if that is the case, 
why should we accept Reductio's conclusion that it is not epistemically 
appropriate for Stella to assert that ~Bp?
Here is why. First, remember that the point of RTBNA is that one 
should only assert what is reasonable to believe. But asserting something 
one knows to be incompatible with one's evidence amounts to asserting 
something one knows to be unreasonable4. This suggests a plausible 
sufficient condition on meta-assertions (i.e., assertions whose content 
is about one's own mental states):
UBNA (Unreasonable Belief Norm of Assertion): One should not assert 
that p if one knows it is not reasonable for one to believe that p.
A norm like UBNA seems prima facie plausible and it appears to 
do justice to the intuition we expressed a couple of paragraphs ago. If 
something like UBNA is correct, then the proponent of selfless assertions 
could deny step 2 by denying that it is reasonable for Stella to assert 
the second conjunct in (p & ~Bp). But there are other problems with (!).
Suppose you are looking at a long list of confirmed guests for a party 
you are throwing.5 There are 150 names on the list. you have put the list 
together yourself. Now, with respect to each individual guest on this list, 
it is reasonable for you to believe that he or she will come to the party 
(they have all RSVP'd). Furthermore, since it is epistemically reasonable 
for you to believe, with respect to each individual guest, that he/she will 
come, it is epistemically proper for you to assert 'x will come to the party,' 
for each particular guest x. Multiple applications of (!)6 deliver the result 
that it is epistemically proper for you to assert 'All 150 people on the list 
will come to my party.' Intuitively, however, it is not reasonable for you 
to believe 'All 150 people on the list will come to my party.' Guests do 
catch colds, their relatives do die unexpectedly and so on. It seems like 
 
3 As a matter of fact, we could require even more here, for it appears to be the case that the 
requirements of even stronger norms of assertion (e.g., the knowledge norm of assertion) 
have been fulfilled. 
4 As we remarked in footnote 2, the fact that this belief is contrary to her evidence is stipulated 
by the example.
5 This example is adapted from Hawthorne (2004, p. 48-9).
6 That is, if it is appropriate for you to believe that guest A will come to the party and if it is 
appropriate for you to believe that guest B will come to the party, then it is appropriate for 
you to believe that both guests A and B will come to party. But, if it is appropriate for you 
to believe that both guests A and B will come to the party and if it is appropriate for you to 
believe that guest C will come to the party, then it is appropriate for you to believe that both 
guests A and B will come to the party and that guest C will come to the party; and so on 
and so forth until the conjunction includes all 150 guests.
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you should take those possibilities into consideration. But, if this is right, 
then, intuitively, it is not the case that it is reasonable for you to believe 
'All 150 people on the list will come to my party,' and, a fortiriori, it is not 
epistemically appropriate for you to assert it.
Lottery and preface scenarios also falsify (!). It seems reasonable for 
you to believe, of each ticket in a large and fair lottery that it is a loser. 
So, according to RTBNA, it is appropriate for you to assert, of each ticket 
in the lottery, that it is a loser.  But, multiple applications of (!) would 
entail that it is epistemically appropriate for you to assert 'All tickets in 
the lottery are losers.' But this contradicts what you know to be true: that 
there is exactly one winner. After finishing your book, it seems that it is 
reasonable for you to believe, of each claim you make in the book, that 
it is true. Again, multiple applications of (!) would deliver the result that 
it is epistemically appropriate for you to assert 'All claims in my book 
are true.' This result contradicts what seems very likely given your total 
evidence: that at least one claim in my book is false.
We believe that, when taken together, the considerations above make 
a very strong case against step 2 in Reductio. In particular, they highlight 
the fact that RTBNA is in tension with the plausible UBNA and (!) leads 
to paradox --- after all, (p & ~Bp) is a Moorean paradoxical conjunction 
and for that reason never properly asserted (cf. Moore:1993). Surprisingly, 
however, Lackey does not take any of this to be a good enough reason to 
reject 2. Quite the opposite, she argues that it is epistemically proper for 
Stella to assert (p & ~Bp), because it satisfies RTBNA.7 So, while rejecting 
step 2 of Reductio is a move that is available to others, it is not available 
to philosophers who accept both RTBNA and that selfless assertions 
are epistemically proper. The price one pays for this theoretical package 
includes accepting a deeply flawed principle, (!), accepting that asserting 
Moorean conjunctions of the form (p & ~Bp) is sometimes epistemically 
proper (i.e., when one is the speaker in a case of selfless assertion).
Lackey does try to explain the oddity of asserting Moorean conjunctions, 
however. Even though she is committed to saying that it is epistemically 
proper to assert those conjunctions in cases of selfless assertions, she 
thinks asserting Moorean conjunctions is always conversationally odd 
or improper. We come back to this issue below and suggest that this 
account of Moorean conjunctions does not work.
Step 4 says that, if it is epistemically proper for Stella to assert 
(p & ~Bp), then she would be justified in believing that conjunction were 
 
7 This is the relevant passage (the emphasis is Lackey's): '... there are some Moorean paradoxes 
that clearly do satisfy RTBNA on my view: namely cases involving selfless assertions' 
(LACkEy, 2007, p. 613).
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she to believe it on her evidence. This step is a direct consequence of RB 
above. Step 4 simply applies RB to cases of selfless assertion.
This brings us to step 6 and to the main reason why it is not 
epistemically proper for subjects in cases of selfless assertion to assert. 
From step 2 we get that it is reasonable for Stella to believe (p & ~Bp). 
But, given (RB+), if it is reasonable for Stella to believe (p & ~Bp), then 
her evidence makes (p & ~Bp) likely to be true in the actual world. The 
problem is that subjects in selfless assertion cases not only withhold 
belief in what they assert, but they also believe in the denial of what 
they assert. For example, given Stella's denial of evolution, her evidence 
set includes not only ~Bp but also ~p. This means that Stella's evidence 
set includes ~p. But, given this, the objective likelihood of p, conditional 
on her evidence is 0 (zero), for the truth of ~p entails that p is false. And 
since the probability of a conjunction is the product of the probability of its 
conjuncts, the likelihood of (p & ~Bp) being true given Stella's evidence 
is also 0 (zero). As selfless as Stella may be, her selflessness comes with 
the price of being unreasonable.
Note that this line of reasoning in support of step 6 exploits the 
doxastic oddity of Moorean conjunctions (i.e., the fact that believing 
Moorean conjunctions is irrational) and cannot, therefore, be blocked by 
an account of the conversational oddity of asserting those conjunctions 
(i.e., the fact that asserting Moorean conjunctions is practically irrational). 
In her treatment of Moorean conjunctions, Lackey unfortunately gives us 
only a treatment of their conversational oddity, leaving the irrationality 
of believing those conjunctions untouched. Still, there's good reason 
to believe that not even her explanation of the conversational oddity 
succeeds.
Lackey (2007, p. 616-617) suggests we account for the conversational 
oddity of Moorean conjunctions with a version of Paul Grice's maxim of 
quantity8, the Not Misleading Norm of Assertion:
(NMNA) S should assert that p in context C only if it is not reasonable for 
S to believe that the assertion that p will be misleading in C relative to the 
purposes of the exchange in question.
The idea is that, given NMNA, it is reasonable for Stella to believe that 
asserting ‘Modern day Homo Sapiens evolved from Homo Erectus, but I 
do not believe they did’ would mislead her audience. Her audience would 
be mislead either because Stella's assertion offered more information than 
 
8 The maxim of quantity says that one should make one’s contribution as informative as it is 
required for the current purposes of the conversation one is in. See Grice (1991, p. 30-31).
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it was required by the purpose of the conversation or because it offered 
less information than it was required by the purpose of the conversation. 
By asserting that she does not believe that modern day Homo Sapiens 
evolved from Homo Erectus, Stella is imparting more information than 
her audience needs, because the purpose of her conversation is one 
of informing students about the evolutionary history of Homo Sapiens 
according to the prevailing evolutionary biology, not one of informing 
students about her views on evolutionary biology. What is more, since it 
is reasonable for Stella to believe that asserting the Moorean conjunction 
would mislead her audience in this way, NMNA seems to deliver the 
result that Stella should refrain from asserting ‘Homo Sapiens evolved 
from Homo Erectus, but I don’t believe they did’. On the other hand, even 
if the purpose of the conversation included Stella's views on evolutionary 
biology, she would still impart less information than required by the 
purpose of her conversation because students could not plausibly be 
expected to see the relevance of what she asserted, for they know 
nothing about her peculiar situation as a creationist teacher having to 
teach evolution. 
Appealing to NMNA in this way in order to explain what is 
conversationally odd with Moorean conjunctions will not suffice, however. 
Moorean conjunctions clash with our linguistic intuitions in a way that 
is similar to the way in which contradictions clash with our linguistic 
intuitions.9 When asserted, Moorean conjunctions and contradictions 
cause the type of dissonance in one's audience that forces them to 
conclude that the speaker is either trying to implicate something (as 
when one says 'yes and no' to implicate that one does not care for the 
question that is on the table) or that she has opted out of the conversation. 
But this is not what NMNA says. According to NMNA, Stella's assertion 
of the Moorean conjunction ‘Homo Sapiens evolved from Homo Erectus, 
but I don’t believe they did’ would be merely conversationally confusing 
or awkward, rather than what it seems to actually be – borderline 
nonsensical. Hence, even if true, NMNA explains, at most, why asserting 
‘p, but I don’t believe that p’ misleads one's audience in a way that is 
similar to the way in which assertions in a foreign language that are 
not accompanied by translation also mislead.10 The result is that it is far 
from clear that NMNA explains the conversational oddity of asserting 
Moorean conjunctions. But, if not NMNA, what explain the relevant 
phenomena? 
9 This way of putting what makes Moorean conjunctions conversationally odd is keith DeRose's 
(2009: 96 fn. 19; 208 fn. 17). See also Benton (2013) for further discussion of this point.
10 Cf. Doven (2006: 475).
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We believe that the most promising explanation of the relevant 
phenomena appeals to the fact that speakers represent themselves as 
knowing what they assert, and that in most contexts a speaker who 
asserts a Moorean conjunction of the form 'p & ~Bp' asserts something 
her audience knows the speaker cannot possibly know.11 In order to 
know (p & ~Bp) one needs to know both p and ~Bp. But, if knowledge 
requires belief, then one knows p only if Bp is true. The problem, of 
course, is that Bp and ~Bp cannot both be true, and, hence, whoever 
asserts that (p & ~Bp) asserts something they cannot possibly know. 
The dissonance hearers experience is thus explained by the fact that the 
speaker is representing herself as doing something she couldn't possibly 
do -- knowing (p & ~Bp). What is more, this explanation of what is 
conversationally odd about asserting Moorean conjunctions of the form 
(p & ~Bp) is exactly the same as the explanation of what is conversationally 
odd about asserting contradictions (which is the result we wanted): 
whoever asserts that (p & ~p) represents herself as doing something 
that she could not possibly do – knowing (p & ~p). This explanation of 
the relevant conversational phenomena is much more promising than 
the one based on NMNA.
One might object that our explanation is not fully satisfactory, for 
it does not seem well suited to explain the conversational oddity in 
asserting conjunctions of the form (p & B~p), which some take to be 
another form of Moorean conjunction.12 While no one both believes that 
p and fail to believe that p (which explains why asserting (p & ~Bp) 
is conversationally odd), it might be the case that some believe that 
p and believe that ~p. This latter fact would seem to prevent us from 
explaining the conversational oddity of asserting conjunctions of the 
form (p & B~p) because they may sometimes be known (as when one 
comes to know one is gullible). In which case, sometimes speakers who 
assert that (p & B~p) would represent themselves truthfully. Our reply 
to this objection challenges the assumption that asserting (p & B~p) is 
as conversationally odd as asserting (p & ~Bp). While one will not be 
able to produce a case where it is appropriate to assert that (p & B~p), 
 
11 See Unger (1975) for a discussion of the idea that asserting that p causes the speaker to 
represent herself as knowing that p. Williamson (2000), and others, argue for the the stronger 
view that one should assert only what one knows. We are sympathetic to the Williamsonian 
suggestion not least because, if it is true, it would explain the more obvious fact that one 
represents oneself as knowing that p whenever one asserts that p (because asserting that p 
imparts the information that one satisfies the norm of assertion, which requires knowledge). 
However, since the weaker claim that one represents oneself as knowing p by asserting p is 
all we need in order to explain the conversational oddity of Moorean conjunctions, we choose 
to remain agnostic on whether the stronger view is true or not.
12 For example, Sorensen (1998).
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examples in which asserting (p & B~p) is felicitous are not that hard to 
find. Here is quite possibly one such case.13 
John and Mary are very good friends who know each other for over 
thirty years. They enjoy the same things and, in particular, they enjoy 
discussing their personal lives with each other. One day, after telling John 
about her brother-in-law and the weekend they spent together with their 
respective partners in a cabin in the woods, John starts suspecting that 
Mary is in love with her brother-in-law, but that she doesn't believe she is. 
John thinks Mary is in love with her brother-in-law because she is really 
excited about everything he does and it is always very happy when she 
talks about the time they spend together. Plus, John knows Mary well 
and he has seen the same signs of infatuation when she was getting to 
know her current husband. John thinks Mary doesn't believe she loves 
her brother-in-law because she sincerely tells him she loves only her 
husband. A few weeks after their conversation about Mary's weekend, 
John decides to confront Mary with her own feelings for her brother-in-
law. He explains to her how she seems excited every time she talks about 
her brother-in-law, while insisting that she loves only her husband. After 
listening attentively to John's heartfelt and honest description, Mary is 
surprised with herself. After thinking for a few seconds, she turns to John 
and says 'yes, I love my brother-in-law, but I believe I don't.' 
We think that what Mary said is perfectly fine in the context of her 
conversation. But this should not be the case if the objection we are 
considering were on the right track. It is important to note that the 
non-oddity of this assertion is in sharp contrast with the clear oddity of 
Mary's assertion of 'I love my brother-in-law, but I don't believe I do'. As 
our account based on knowledge representation predicted, the latter but 
not the former assertion clashes with our linguistic intuitions.
This concludes our case against the view that selfless assertions are 
epistemic proper. 
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